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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine the impact of horizontal mergers amongst insurers on competition in the Medicare Part D prescription drug
market. Theory predictions about the effect of
mergers on price and product quality are confounded by three competing forces: increased
cost efficiency, market power, and bargaining
power with upstream suppliers. Using panel
data for the full set of plans offered by Part D
insurers between 2006-2012, we use a differences-in-differences identification strategy to
document the effect that merger activity has on
plan pricing and drug coverage characteristics.
We find that plans affected by a merger experience higher premiums as a result of increased
market power. However, for merging insurers
that restructure their plan offerings, price falls
to offset the market power effect. The results on
drug formulary measures show that merging
on its own has no effect on the generosity of
drug coverage. Yet for restructured plans, there
are sizable merger effects on coverage in the
form of reduced copay/coinsurance rates and
increased
scope in the
set of covered drugs.
The lowered
prices and
improved
drug coverage for restructured
plans suggest cost
efficiencies and
bargaining
power with
drug suppliers are a
major source of gains stemming from mergers.

BACKGROUND:
MEDICARE
PART D
Medicare Part D is a program that expands existing health insurance coverage for the elderly.
It adds prescription drug coverage to Medicare.
It was authorized under the 2003 “Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization” Act and enacted in 2006.
As of January 1st, 2006 22.5mln of 43mln eligible individuals signed up. Enrollment is voluntary*.

MOTIVATION
Part D is a recently created program that established a
regulated and subsidized insurance exchange for senior citizens to purchase prescription drug coverage
from competing private insurers. The program lifetime
overlapped with a dozen large scale horizontal M&A
deals involving the parent companies of insurers offering Part D plans. Each year, an average of 16% of all
insurance plans are directly affected by an M&A deal.
Theoretical effect of mergers is ambigous. There are
three competing forces involved:

1. Increased productive efficiency or enhanced quality of product offerings (+)
2. Increased monopsony or bargaining power over
suppliers (+)
3. Reduced competition that leads to higher prices
for customers and/or lower product quality if firms
compete on quality dimensions (-)

• I. Price effects (on plan premiums)
• II. Quality effects
1. number of top100 drugs covered
2. total number of drugs covered
3. price of the basket of top-100 drugs
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TOP-100 DRUGS COVERAGE

PLAN-LEVEL
DATA
We utilize detailed longitudinal data on plans that includes an average of 1,500 stand-alone, Part D plans
(PDPs) per year. The data span 7 years from 2006 when
Medicare Part D was introduced to the most recently
available data in 2012 and covers all 39 geographical
markets.
During the sample period the premium increased by
43% and the average plan market share went up by approximately the same amount. Another way to look at
it, average plan enrollment of all and in particular subsidized beneficiaries increased. The number of plans
offered in each region plummeted. The program enrollment grew by 16% over 7 years.
Plan-level data come from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid.

MERGER DEALS

Part D is subsidized by the government but the
benefit is offered by private insurers who may
freely enter and exit the market, choose the
number of plans to offer, and set monthly premiums. They are also largely responsible for the
benefit design: the number and type of drugs to
cover and the conditions of such coverage.

We collected data on M&A activity from the Securities
Data Company merger and acquisition module which
contains detailed information on all deals involving public and private companies.

The government is not involved in drug prices
negotiations.

We report four main sets of results on the effects of mergers:

We overcome one of the main drawbacks experienced
by the earlier research by obtaining a highly detailed
data set.

Estimated 10-year program cost between
2009-2018 is $727.3bn (Medicare Trustees Report).

The regulations establish a number of coverage
standards. All providers are required to offer at
least one basic plan that meets (or is actuarially
equivalent to) a minimum coverage level with
respect to the deductible, coinsurance and copayment rates, and the scope of drugs covered
on the formulary. In addition to a basic plan, the
companies may offer enhanced plans that have
more generous coverage through a combination of lower deductibles, lower copay/coinsurance rates, and drug coverage for a larger set of
medical condition.

IMPACT OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS ON
PLAN PREMIUMS & DRUG FORMULARIES
IN MEDICARE PART D

RESULTS

In the time frame suitable for our analysis, from 2006 to
2011 we identified a total of 11 completed horizontal
M&A deals amongst companies that offer Medicare Part
D policies.
We restrict attention to horizontal mergers and acquisitions of assets where either participants or their immediate subsidiary offered a PDP at least in the year prior
to the merger completion date. We exclude all the deals
where one or both companies belong to a non-Part D
line of insurance (such
as life insurance), joint
ventures of
Part D insurers into related lines
of business
(such as
pharmacy management) and vertical mergers with pharmacies.

ALL-DRUGS COVERAGE

EMPIRICAL MODEL
We run several differences-in-differences specifications to estimate the treatment effect of
M&A deals on health plan characteristics. The first set of specifications considers the effect
of mergers on the monthly premium (plan price). Then, these specifications are re-estimated
for the plan quality characteristics.
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